Information requests

January 1 – June 30, 2012
CountryAccount information requestsPercentage where some information producedAccounts specified
Australia < 10 33% < 10
Austria < 10 0% < 10
Brazil < 10 0% < 10
Bulgaria < 10 0% < 10
Canada 11 18% 12
France < 10 0% < 10
Germany < 10 0% < 10
Greece < 10 33% < 10
India < 10 0% < 10
Indonesia < 10 0% < 10
Italy < 10 0% < 10
Japan 98 20% 147
Korea, Republic of < 10 0% < 10
Mexico < 10 0% < 10
Netherlands < 10 50% < 10
Peru < 10 0% < 10
Portugal < 10 0% < 10
Spain < 10 0% 12
Sweden < 10 0% < 10
Switzerland < 10 0% < 10
Turkey < 10 0% < 10
United Kingdom 11 18% 11
United States 679 75% 948
TOTAL 849 63% 1,181
NOTE: The data in these reports is as accurate as possible, but may not be 100% comprehensive.

About the numbers

We received user information requests from 23 different governments during the first half of 2012. 

Footnotes

  • We notify affected users of requests for their account information unless we’re prohibited.
  • To minimize potential risk to ongoing investigations, we’re not including specific numbers for countries where we’ve received fewer than 10 requests; instead you’ll see ‘< 10’ in the relevant cells.
    • Same holds true for number of ‘Accounts specified’ — to minimize potential risk to our users, we’re not including specific numbers where fewer than 10 ‘Users / accounts specified’ are affected; instead you’ll see ‘<10’ in the relevant cells.
  • ‘Accounts specified’ includes the accounts identified in government requests we’ve received, and may include the same account being requested more than once or requests for accounts that do not exist or were misidentified.
  • We may not comply with every request for a variety of reasons. For example:
    • We do not comply with requests that fail to identify a Twitter user account.
    • We may seek to narrow requests that are overly broad.
    • In other cases, users may have challenged the requests after we’ve notified them.