Information requests include worldwide government requests we’ve received for account information, typically in connection with criminal investigations. For the first time, we’ve also included separate data covering global non-government (non-voluntary) information requests received through legal process.
The latest report includes the number of government requests received for account information, as well as the percentage of requests we complied with in whole or in part. We also mark countries in which we have received emergency disclosure requests only with an asterisk. During the latest reporting period, we have received inquiries from four new countries – Belize, El Salvador, Kenya, and Russia – since our last report, bringing the total to 58 countries since the inception of Twitter’s Transparency Report.
Latest report: Information requests (government)
July 1 - December 31, 2014
| Country | Account information requests | Percentage where some information produced | Accounts specified |
|---|---|---|---|
| Albania | - | - | - |
| Argentina | 3 | 33% | 4 |
| Australia | 10* | 50% | 10 |
| Austria | - | - | - |
| Bahrain | - | - | - |
| Belgium | 1* | 0% | 1 |
| Belize | 1 | 0% | 1 |
| Brazil | 50 | 14% | 158 |
| Bulgaria | - | - | - |
| Canada | 32 | 34% | 37 |
| Chile | - | - | - |
| Colombia | 3 | 0% | 4 |
| Denmark | 3 | 33% | 3 |
| Ecuador | - | - | - |
| Egypt | 1* | 0% | 2 |
| El Salvador | 1 | 0% | 1 |
| France | 60 | 13% | 81 |
| Germany | 17 | 12% | 18 |
| Greece | 3* | 0% | 5 |
| Hong Kong | - | - | - |
| India | 41 | 22% | 1938 |
| Indonesia | - | - | - |
| Ireland | - | - | - |
| Israel | 16 | 13% | 23 |
| Italy | - | - | - |
| Japan | 288 | 36% | 343 |
| Kenya | 1* | 0% | 1 |
| Kuwait | 1 | 0% | 1 |
| Lebanon | 3* | 0% | 3 |
| Lithuania | - | - | - |
| Malaysia | - | - | - |
| Maldives | - | - | - |
| Mexico | 7 | 0% | 64 |
| Netherlands | 4 | 25% | 8 |
| New Zealand | 1 | 0% | 2 |
| Norway | 1* | 100% | 1 |
| Oman | - | - | - |
| Pakistan | - | - | - |
| Peru | - | - | - |
| Philippines | - | - | - |
| Portugal | 1 | 0% | 1 |
| Qatar | - | - | - |
| Russia | 108 | 0% | 108 |
| Saudi Arabia | 31* | 6% | 36 |
| Singapore | - | - | - |
| South Korea | 4 | 50% | 4 |
| South Sudan | - | - | - |
| Spain | 69 | 12% | 104 |
| Sri Lanka | - | - | - |
| Sweden | 2 | 0% | 2 |
| Switzerland | 3 | 0% | 3 |
| Thailand | - | - | - |
| Trinidad and Tobago | - | - | - |
| Turkey | 356 | 0% | 496 |
| United Arab Emirates | 11 | 0% | 11 |
| United Kingdom | 116 | 34% | 371 |
| United States | 1,622 | 80% | 3,299 |
| Venezuela | - | - | - |
| TOTAL | 2,871 | 52% | 7,144 |
About the numbers
We’ve received ~40% more requests for account information affecting 128% more account holders during the second half of 2014 than in the previous reporting period. As always, we continue to fight to provide notice to affected users when we’re not otherwise prohibited.
The continued rise follows industry trends and is also likely due in part to Twitter’s continued international expansion. There were also several world events during this time period, including various elections and terrorist attacks, which led to an increase in requests.
The United States continues to make the majority of requests for account information, comprising 56% of all requests received. Of the remaining 44%, Turkey became our second largest requester, constituting 12% of all requests (and increasing 11% since the prior report). Japan remains in the top three requesting countries at 10% of the total requests received.
Rounding out the top requesters are the United Kingdom, hovering steadily around 4%, and Russia, which is new to this section of the report. During the second half of 2014, we received a total of 108 requests for account information from Russia, following the passage of its new “bloggers law” in August 2014, to which we have not provided any information.
Footnotes
We notify affected users of requests for their account information unless we’re prohibited.
- More information about user notice is available in our Guidelines for Law Enforcement.
Countries with an asterisk (*) in the ‘Account information requests’ column have submitted emergency requests only.
- More information about emergency disclosure requests is available in our Guidelines for Law Enforcement.
‘Accounts specified’ includes Twitter and Vine accounts identified in government requests we have received.
- The number may include duplicate accounts or requests for accounts that do not exist or were misidentified.
We may not comply with requests for a variety of reasons. For example:
- We do not comply with requests that fail to identify a Twitter account.
- We may seek to narrow requests that are overly broad.
- In other cases, users may have challenged the requests after we’ve notified them.
Latest report: Information requests (non-government)
July 1 - December 31, 2014
| Country | Account information requests | Percentage where some information produced | Accounts specified |
|---|---|---|---|
| Worldwide | 142 | 25% | 455 |
About the numbers
As noted above, we’ve also included requests for account information made through legal process from non-government parties for the first time. NOTE: This does not include a user’s request for his/her own account information. To maximize the privacy of the non-government parties, the data covering these requests has been published as a global aggregate.
Since July 1, 2014, we have received 142 requests for account information from non-government parties through legal process affecting 455 account holders. We have produced account information in response to 25% of these non-voluntary requests, which originated from the following 11 countries: Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States.
Footnotes
We define ‘non-government parties’ as any requester seeking account information on behalf of an account holder or third party in a civil action or by a defendant in a criminal case.
We notify affected users of requests for their account information unless we’re prohibited.
‘Accounts specified’ includes Twitter and Vine accounts identified in non-government requests we have received.
- The number may include duplicate accounts or requests for accounts that do not exist or were misidentified.
We may not comply with requests for a variety of reasons. For example:
- We do not comply with requests that fail to identify a Twitter account.
- We may seek to narrow requests that are overly broad.
- In other cases, users may have challenged the requests after we’ve notified them.